other: 0.836 permissions: 0.817 vnc: 0.788 KVM: 0.779 device: 0.765 semantic: 0.755 graphic: 0.749 performance: 0.748 debug: 0.739 PID: 0.714 network: 0.620 boot: 0.616 files: 0.579 socket: 0.541 QEMU: net: vmxnet: integer overflow may crash guest * Gaoning Pan from Zhejiang University & Ant Security Light-Year Lab reported a malloc failure issue locates in vmxnet3_activate_device() of qemu/hw/net/vmxnet3.c NIC emulator * This issue is reproducible because while activating the NIC device, vmxnet3_activate_device does not validate guest supplied configuration values against predefined min/max limits. @@ -1420,6 +1420,7 @@ static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s) vmxnet3_setup_rx_filtering(s); /* Cache fields from shared memory */ s->mtu = VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED32(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.mtu); + assert(VMXNET3_MIN_MTU <= s->mtu && s->mtu < VMXNET3_MAX_MTU); <= Did not check if MTU is within range VMW_CFPRN("MTU is %u", s->mtu); s->max_rx_frags = @@ -1473,6 +1474,9 @@ static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s) /* Read rings memory locations for TX queues */ pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qdescr_pa, conf.txRingBasePA); size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qdescr_pa, conf.txRingSize); + if (size > VMXNET3_TX_RING_MAX_SIZE) { <= Did not check TX ring size + size = VMXNET3_TX_RING_MAX_SIZE; + } vmxnet3_ring_init(d, &s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring, pa, size, sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc), false); @@ -1483,6 +1487,9 @@ static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s) /* TXC ring */ pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qdescr_pa, conf.compRingBasePA); size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qdescr_pa, conf.compRingSize); + if (size > VMXNET3_TC_RING_MAX_SIZE) { <= Did not check TC ring size + size = VMXNET3_TC_RING_MAX_SIZE; + } vmxnet3_ring_init(d, &s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size, sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc), true); VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TXC", i, &s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring); @@ -1524,6 +1531,9 @@ static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s) /* RX rings */ pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qd_pa, conf.rxRingBasePA[j]); size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qd_pa, conf.rxRingSize[j]); + if (size > VMXNET3_RX_RING_MAX_SIZE) { <= Did not check RX ring size + size = VMXNET3_RX_RING_MAX_SIZE; + } vmxnet3_ring_init(d, &s->rxq_descr[i].rx_ring[j], pa, size, sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc), false); VMW_CFPRN("RX queue %d:%d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d", @@ -1533,6 +1543,9 @@ static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s) /* RXC ring */ pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qd_pa, conf.compRingBasePA); size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qd_pa, conf.compRingSize); + if (size > VMXNET3_RC_RING_MAX_SIZE) { <= Did not check RC ring size + size = VMXNET3_RC_RING_MAX_SIZE; + } This may lead to potential integer overflow OR OOB buffer access issues. CVE-2021-20203 assigned by Red Hat Inc. Is this the same as https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1890152 ? Yes, from the trace looks same. This is an automated cleanup. This bug report has been moved to QEMU's new bug tracker on gitlab.com and thus gets marked as 'expired' now. Please continue with the discussion here: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/308