diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 32 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/virtiofsd/helper.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 15 |
3 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst index 07ac0be551..0c0560203c 100644 --- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst @@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ Options * posix_acl|no_posix_acl - Enable/disable posix acl support. Posix ACLs are disabled by default. + * security_label|no_security_label - + Enable/disable security label support. Security labels are disabled by + default. This will allow client to send a MAC label of file during + file creation. Typically this is expected to be SELinux security + label. Server will try to set that label on newly created file + atomically wherever possible. + .. option:: --socket-path=PATH Listen on vhost-user UNIX domain socket at PATH. @@ -348,6 +355,31 @@ client arguments or lists returned from the host. This stops the client seeing any 'security.' attributes on the server and stops it setting any. +SELinux support +--------------- +One can enable support for SELinux by running virtiofsd with option +"-o security_label". But this will try to save guest's security context +in xattr security.selinux on host and it might fail if host's SELinux +policy does not permit virtiofsd to do this operation. + +Hence, it is preferred to remap guest's "security.selinux" xattr to say +"trusted.virtiofs.security.selinux" on host. + +"-o xattrmap=:map:security.selinux:trusted.virtiofs.:" + +This will make sure that guest and host's SELinux xattrs on same file +remain separate and not interfere with each other. And will allow both +host and guest to implement their own separate SELinux policies. + +Setting trusted xattr on host requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. So one will need +add this capability to daemon. + +"-o modcaps=+sys_admin" + +Giving CAP_SYS_ADMIN increases the risk on system. Now virtiofsd is more +powerful and if gets compromised, it can do lot of damage to host system. +So keep this trade-off in my mind while making a decision. + Examples -------- diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c index a8295d975a..e226fc590f 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ void fuse_cmdline_help(void) " default: no_allow_direct_io\n" " -o announce_submounts Announce sub-mount points to the guest\n" " -o posix_acl/no_posix_acl Enable/Disable posix_acl. (default: disabled)\n" + " -o security_label/no_security_label Enable/Disable security label. (default: disabled)\n" ); } diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c index f5d584e18a..4742be1d1e 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ struct lo_data { int user_posix_acl, posix_acl; /* Keeps track if /proc/<pid>/attr/fscreate should be used or not */ bool use_fscreate; + int user_security_label; }; static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = { @@ -215,6 +216,8 @@ static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = { { "no_killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 0 }, { "posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 1 }, { "no_posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 0 }, + { "security_label", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_security_label), 1 }, + { "no_security_label", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_security_label), 0 }, FUSE_OPT_END }; static bool use_syslog = false; @@ -808,6 +811,17 @@ static void lo_init(void *userdata, struct fuse_conn_info *conn) fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling posix_acl\n"); conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL; } + + if (lo->user_security_label == 1) { + if (!(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX)) { + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "lo_init: Can not enable security label." + " kernel does not support FUSE_SECURITY_CTX capability.\n"); + } + conn->want |= FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; + } else { + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling security label\n"); + conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; + } } static void lo_getattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, @@ -4288,6 +4302,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) .proc_self_task = -1, .user_killpriv_v2 = -1, .user_posix_acl = -1, + .user_security_label = -1, }; struct lo_map_elem *root_elem; struct lo_map_elem *reserve_elem; |