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Diffstat (limited to 'include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 99 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 99 deletions
diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h deleted file mode 100644 index 02dc4e518f..0000000000 --- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -/* - * QEMU Confidential Guest support - * This interface describes the common pieces between various - * schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a - * compromised hypervisor. This includes memory encryption (AMD's - * SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER, - * or PV on s390x). - * - * Copyright Red Hat. - * - * Authors: - * David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> - * - * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or - * later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. - * - */ -#ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H -#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H - -#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY - -#include "qom/object.h" - -#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support" -OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, - ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, - CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) - - -struct ConfidentialGuestSupport { - Object parent; - - /* - * True if the machine should use guest_memfd for RAM. - */ - bool require_guest_memfd; - - /* - * ready: flag set by CGS initialization code once it's ready to - * start executing instructions in a potentially-secure - * guest - * - * The definition here is a bit fuzzy, because this is essentially - * part of a self-sanity-check, rather than a strict mechanism. - * - * It's not feasible to have a single point in the common machine - * init path to configure confidential guest support, because - * different mechanisms have different interdependencies requiring - * initialization in different places, often in arch or machine - * type specific code. It's also usually not possible to check - * for invalid configurations until that initialization code. - * That means it would be very easy to have a bug allowing CGS - * init to be bypassed entirely in certain configurations. - * - * Silently ignoring a requested security feature would be bad, so - * to avoid that we check late in init that this 'ready' flag is - * set if CGS was requested. If the CGS init hasn't happened, and - * so 'ready' is not set, we'll abort. - */ - bool ready; -}; - -typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass { - ObjectClass parent; - - int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp); - int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp); -} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass; - -static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, - Error **errp) -{ - ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass; - - klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs); - if (klass->kvm_init) { - return klass->kvm_init(cgs, errp); - } - - return 0; -} - -static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, - Error **errp) -{ - ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass; - - klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs); - if (klass->kvm_reset) { - return klass->kvm_reset(cgs, errp); - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* !CONFIG_USER_ONLY */ - -#endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */ |