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+device: 0.761
+TCG: 0.697
+boot: 0.693
+graphic: 0.667
+network: 0.537
+socket: 0.478
+files: 0.465
+risc-v: 0.449
+kernel: 0.446
+vnc: 0.441
+arm: 0.373
+semantic: 0.369
+register: 0.363
+architecture: 0.357
+PID: 0.344
+ppc: 0.321
+mistranslation: 0.293
+peripherals: 0.290
+permissions: 0.277
+performance: 0.241
+i386: 0.234
+hypervisor: 0.219
+x86: 0.216
+virtual: 0.160
+VMM: 0.159
+debug: 0.149
+user-level: 0.124
+KVM: 0.076
+assembly: 0.070
+
+qemu-2.12.1 crashes when running malicious bootloader.
+
+Running specific bootloader on Qemu causes fatal error and 
+hence SIGABRT in /qemu-2.12.1/tcg/tcg.c on line 2684.
+
+Bootloader binary code is included in attachments.
+The code was generated by assembling a valid bootloader, then
+appending random-bytes from file `/dev/urandom` to the binary file.
+
+
+
+This is a bug, obviously, but note that we do not guarantee TCG binary translation to be a security boundary against malicious code. Don't run guest code you don't trust inside TCG without further sandboxing around QEMU. (Much of the code that runs in a TCG configuration is old and unaudited, so there may be lurking bugs. Configurations using KVM are the only ones where we treat guest escapes as security bugs.)
+
+
+I think this bug was fixed in QEMU 3.1 -- I can reproduce the assert on 3.0 but not on 3.1.
+
+