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authorMaciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>2025-07-15 16:37:37 +0200
committerCédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>2025-07-15 17:11:12 +0200
commit300dcf58b72fa1635190b19f102231b0775e93cb (patch)
treeef712b0fe23af924c43bbab81ec40948d9027aa2 /docs/devel
parent6380b0a02fbdac253b8a98b300398319ab655237 (diff)
downloadfocaccia-qemu-300dcf58b72fa1635190b19f102231b0775e93cb.tar.gz
focaccia-qemu-300dcf58b72fa1635190b19f102231b0775e93cb.zip
vfio/migration: Max in-flight VFIO device state buffers size limit
Allow capping the maximum total size of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the destination, otherwise a malicious QEMU source could
theoretically cause the target QEMU to allocate unlimited amounts of memory
for buffers-in-flight.

Since this is not expected to be a realistic threat in most of VFIO live
migration use cases and the right value depends on the particular setup
disable this limit by default by setting it to UINT64_MAX.

Reviewed-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Avihai Horon <avihaih@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/4f7cad490988288f58e36b162d7a888ed7e7fd17.1752589295.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/devel')
-rw-r--r--docs/devel/migration/vfio.rst13
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/devel/migration/vfio.rst b/docs/devel/migration/vfio.rst
index dae3a98830..0790e5031d 100644
--- a/docs/devel/migration/vfio.rst
+++ b/docs/devel/migration/vfio.rst
@@ -248,6 +248,19 @@ The multifd VFIO device state transfer is controlled by
 AUTO, which means that VFIO device state transfer via multifd channels is
 attempted in configurations that otherwise support it.
 
+Since the target QEMU needs to load device state buffers in-order it needs to
+queue incoming buffers until they can be loaded into the device.
+This means that a malicious QEMU source could theoretically cause the target
+QEMU to allocate unlimited amounts of memory for such buffers-in-flight.
+
+The "x-migration-max-queued-buffers-size" property allows capping the total size
+of these VFIO device state buffers queued at the destination.
+
+Because a malicious QEMU source causing OOM on the target is not expected to be
+a realistic threat in most of VFIO live migration use cases and the right value
+depends on the particular setup by default this queued buffers size limit is
+disabled by setting it to UINT64_MAX.
+
 Some host platforms (like ARM64) require that VFIO device config is loaded only
 after all iterables were loaded, during non-iterables loading phase.
 Such interlocking is controlled by "x-migration-load-config-after-iter" VFIO