9pfs: local: lremovexattr: don't follow symlinks

The local_lremovexattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lremovexattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
but the rightmost one.

This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fremovexattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lremovexattr().

local_lremovexattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().

This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-xattr-user.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-xattr-user.c
index 1840a5db66..2c90817b75 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-xattr-user.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-xattr-user.c
@@ -81,9 +81,6 @@ static int mp_user_setxattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path, const char *name,
 static int mp_user_removexattr(FsContext *ctx,
                                const char *path, const char *name)
 {
-    char *buffer;
-    int ret;
-
     if (strncmp(name, "user.virtfs.", 12) == 0) {
         /*
          * Don't allow fetch of user.virtfs namesapce
@@ -92,10 +89,7 @@ static int mp_user_removexattr(FsContext *ctx,
         errno = EACCES;
         return -1;
     }
-    buffer = rpath(ctx, path);
-    ret = lremovexattr(buffer, name);
-    g_free(buffer);
-    return ret;
+    return local_removexattr_nofollow(ctx, path, name);
 }
 
 XattrOperations mapped_user_xattr = {