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| author | Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> | 2022-06-08 19:38:49 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> | 2022-06-08 19:38:49 +0100 |
| commit | 730d5c31d8872e94d08877ad62f44cc49bc01c90 (patch) | |
| tree | dddc02131c20b0e6fae2810e76d23b2c162a22ac /target/arm/ptw.c | |
| parent | 1f2e87e5aba133ecf4c85000a61d5d760176dd6c (diff) | |
| download | focaccia-qemu-730d5c31d8872e94d08877ad62f44cc49bc01c90.tar.gz focaccia-qemu-730d5c31d8872e94d08877ad62f44cc49bc01c90.zip | |
target/arm: Move get_phys_addr_pmsav8 to ptw.c
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20220604040607.269301-9-richard.henderson@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'target/arm/ptw.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | target/arm/ptw.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 27715dbfa8..28caa7a7ae 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -605,6 +605,83 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, return !(*prot & (1 << access_type)); } +static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, + MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, + hwaddr *phys_ptr, MemTxAttrs *txattrs, + int *prot, target_ulong *page_size, + ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) +{ + uint32_t secure = regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx); + V8M_SAttributes sattrs = {}; + bool ret; + bool mpu_is_subpage; + + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) { + v8m_security_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, &sattrs); + if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { + /* + * Instruction fetches always use the MMU bank and the + * transaction attribute determined by the fetch address, + * regardless of CPU state. This is painful for QEMU + * to handle, because it would mean we need to encode + * into the mmu_idx not just the (user, negpri) information + * for the current security state but also that for the + * other security state, which would balloon the number + * of mmu_idx values needed alarmingly. + * Fortunately we can avoid this because it's not actually + * possible to arbitrarily execute code from memory with + * the wrong security attribute: it will always generate + * an exception of some kind or another, apart from the + * special case of an NS CPU executing an SG instruction + * in S&NSC memory. So we always just fail the translation + * here and sort things out in the exception handler + * (including possibly emulating an SG instruction). + */ + if (sattrs.ns != !secure) { + if (sattrs.nsc) { + fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_NSCExec; + } else { + fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault; + } + *page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 1 : TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; + *phys_ptr = address; + *prot = 0; + return true; + } + } else { + /* + * For data accesses we always use the MMU bank indicated + * by the current CPU state, but the security attributes + * might downgrade a secure access to nonsecure. + */ + if (sattrs.ns) { + txattrs->secure = false; + } else if (!secure) { + /* + * NS access to S memory must fault. + * Architecturally we should first check whether the + * MPU information for this address indicates that we + * are doing an unaligned access to Device memory, which + * should generate a UsageFault instead. QEMU does not + * currently check for that kind of unaligned access though. + * If we added it we would need to do so as a special case + * for M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT in arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(). + */ + fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault; + *page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 1 : TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; + *phys_ptr = address; + *prot = 0; + return true; + } + } + } + + ret = pmsav8_mpu_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, phys_ptr, + txattrs, prot, &mpu_is_subpage, fi, NULL); + *page_size = sattrs.subpage || mpu_is_subpage ? 1 : TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; + return ret; +} + /** * get_phys_addr - get the physical address for this virtual address * |